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Major oil spills from tankers often result in severe localized damage.
After the Exxon Valdez grounded on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound,
Alaska, spilling approximately eleven million gallons of oil,1 the federal
government passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA),2 establishing a
federal scheme of oil spill prevention, liability, contingency planning, and
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1998.
1. The Exxon Valdez spill is the largest oil spill in United States waters. S. REP. No. 101-
94, at 2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722,723. The Exxon Valdez spill is only
the thirty-eighth largest globally. Charles Boisseau, Tanker Owners Blast Lax Safety
Standards / Report Urges New Management System, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 4, 1996,
(Business), available in 1996 WL 11568203. The ten largest tanker oil spills, in descending
order, (ship name, location, year, reason, millions of gallons spilled) are: Atlantic Empress,
off Trinidad & Tobago, 1979, collision, 88; Castillo de Belver, Cape Town, 1983, fire, 74;
Amoco Cadiz, Brittany, France, 1978, grounding, 66; Torrey Canyon, Land's End, England,
1967, grounding, 35; Sea Star, Gulf of Oman, 1972, collision, 34; Urquiola, La Coruna,
Spain, 1976, grounding, 30; Hawaiian Patriot, Northern Pacific, 1977, fire, 29; Braer,
Shetland Islands, 1993, grounding, 26; Sea Empress, Milford Haven, Wales, 1996,
grounding, 20 (estimate); Othello, Tralhavet Bay, Sweden, 1970, collision, 18. Katherine
Culbertson, Though Not Directly Responsible, Oil Industry Saddled With Blame For Latest
Big Spill. (Sea Empress off Milford Haven, Wales), 46(65) OIL DAILY, April 8, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 8318351 (citing the WORLD ALMANAC). The largest man-created oil
spill was not a result of tankers, but an oil well blow out. The IXTOC I offshore oil well
blowout into the Bay of Campeche, Mexico released an estimated 150 million gallons
(500,000 tons) of oil into the water. State of Maine 114th Legislature Second Session,
APPENDICES TO THE REPORT OF THE CoMMISsIoN To STUDY MAINE'S OIL CLEANUP
PREPAREDNESS, Appendix E: Oil Spills in Maine and Elsewhere, at 17, Nov. 1990.
2. S. REP. No. 101-94, supra note 1, at 2.
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compensation.3 Although comprehensive, OPA also specifically allows
states to determine their own liability schemes,4 and to enact other types of
legislation.
Washington State was the first state to enact stricter oil pollution
prevention regulations than those contained in OPA.5 These regulations
were challenged by the International Association of Independent Tanker
Owners (Intertanko) in the fall of 1996. The Western District federal court
for Washington held the regulations constitutional.6 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit determined that a few of the challenged rules were unconstitutional
because they were design and construction standards, not operational
standards.7 Rhode Island enacted similar regulations, which became
effective June 1, 1997, after an oil spill fouled its coastline in 1996.
This Comment discusses regulations relating to preventing catastrophic
oil spills from tankers as a result of collisions, groundings, or similar
accidents. The primary objective of this Comment is to propose a method
for states to enact design, construction, and manning requirements to help
prevent oil spills that would survive a federal preemption challenge. The
proposed method is for states to enact the requirements as an alternative to
unlimited liability. By voluntarily adopting the option, a tanker's potential
liability in the event of a spill would be reduce and/or capped. The liability
limit would be instituted once the vessel was found to be in compliance
with the enacted requirements.
Part Il of this Comment outlines tanker regulation in the United States
since the grounding of the Exxon Valdez, highlighting oil spill prevention
provisions and the state law savings clause under OPA. Part III discusses
the actions that Washington has taken to help prevent tanker incidents since
OPA was enacted. This includes a discussion of Washington's regulations
and the Intertanko case. Finally, the Comment presents the proposed
liability scheme and why it should survive a preemption challenge.
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994).
4. Id. § 2718.
5. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.211.005 to 43.211.030 (West Supp. 1998); §§
90.56.005 to 90.56.540; §§ 88.46.010 to 88.46.924 (West 1996); and WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 317-21-010 to 317-21-560 (1995).
6. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D.
Wash. 1996).
7. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053 (9t, Cir. 1998),
reh'g en banc denied, 159 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1998).
8. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 46-12.5.1-1 to 46-12.6-14 (Michie Supp. 1997). These regulations
pertain primarily to tank barges, not self-propelled tankers.
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I. UNITED STATES OIL TANKER REGULATION POST ExxoN VALDEZ
When the public saw the aftermath of an oil spill on U.S. shores up-
close, something had to be done. The sight of oil drenched birds, seals,
fish, and the shoreline elevated what was an abstract possibility to a
shocking reality. The Exxon Valdez spill encouraged Congress to set aside
the differences that had held up comprehensive oil spill regulation for
fifteen years. The result was the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The Act not
only set forth standards that increased liability for responsible parties, but
also actively encouraged prevention. OPA also included an ambiguous
state law savings section.
A. The Problem of Oil Spills from Tankers
To understand the importance of oil spill prevention, a brief discussion
of the effects of oil in the marine environment is necessary. The amount of
oil spilled into U.S. waters by tanker accidents varies annually and a single
catastrophic event such as the Exxon Valdez spill can greatly skew the
figures. About 24.6 million gallons of oil were spilled into U.S. waters in
1989.9 In 1990 16.9 million gallons were spilled.'0 That number further
decreased in 1991 and 1992 to 12 million and 5.9 million gallons respec-
tively." Only about eight percent of the oil spilled is recovered after a
typical spill.'2 That leaves about ninety-two percent of the oil to evaporate,
bum, or be dispersed into the water column or sediments. 3
9. Data Show Decrease in Amount of Oil Spilled In U.S. Since 1989,3(4) OIL SPILL US
LAW REPORT, April 1, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2755615.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Chris Chivers, Troubled Waters: Despite a Wake Up Call Named Exxon Valdez,
Oil Tankers Continue to Foul the World's Waterways, 7(3) E, May 15, 1996, available in
1996 WL 9824903.
13. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reported that by October
1992 "20% of the oil from the Exxon Valdez spill evaporated, 50% biodegraded on land or
water, 14% was recovered or disposed of, less than 1% remains in the water column, 3%
remains on intertidal shorelines in the form of 'highly weathered, biologically inert
materials,' and 12% remains in subtidal sediments, mostly in the Gulf of Alaska and in the
form of 'highly weathered residuals."' Scientists Reveal Impacts of Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,
16(6) OIL SPILL INTELLIGENCE REP., Feb. 11, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2755338.
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Approximately fifty percent of major oil spills are caused by tanker
collisions and groundings. 14 These types of accidents occur primarily
around loading and unloading ports.'" Although most oil spills in U.S.
waters are under 10,000 gallons, the infrequent large spills account for
ninety-five percent of the volume of oil spilled. 6
B. Oil Pollution Act of 1990
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was pushed through Congress as a result
of four oil spills that occurred close in time. 7 The Act is the most
comprehensive domestic oil pollution legislation to date and it establishes
a system of liability,' contingency planning, 9 and prevention. 0 The
14. Finding A Smooth Passage, LLOYD'S LISTINT'L, Oct. 28, 1996, available in 1996
WL 11841924.
15. Id. Unloading ports generally suffer a greater number of such accidents. Id.
16. Eric E. Anderson and Wayne K. Talley, The Oil Spill Size of Tanker and Barge
Accidents: Determinants and Policy Implications, 71(2) LAND ECON. 216, 218 (1995).
Small spills occur fifty times as frequently as large spills. Id. In 1986 there were a reported
366 spills of over seven tons, spilling 1,303,000 tonnes of oil. International Tanker Owners
Pollution Federation Ltd. (ITOPF) (visited Nov. 6, 1996) <http://www.itopf.com>. Ten
incidents accounted for approximately seventy four percent of the total, 958,000 tons. Id.
17. Although the Exxon Valdez spill was the Act's prime mover, S. REP. No. 101-94,
supra note 1, at 723, three other spills in Rhode Island, Delaware, and the Houston Ship
Channel eased its passage. S. REP. No. 101-99, at 2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
750. These spills occurred within 24 hours of each other. Id.
18. Title I of Public Law 101-380 imposed new liability standards for tankers. Unlike
traditional maritime law, Congress imposed upon shippers removal costs and natural
resource damages beyond the value of the vessel. However, Congress did provide for limits
on liability. HouSE CONF. REP. No. 101-653, at 101-104 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 780-82. See also William M. Duncan, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990's
Effect on the Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act, 5 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 303 (1993);
Stephen R. Eubank, Patchwork Justice: State Unlimited Liability Laws in the Wake of the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 18 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 149 (1994); Cynthia M. Wilkinson
et al., Slick Work: An Analysis of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 12 J. ENERGY NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 181 (1992); Frederick J. Carr, Comment, Statutory Liabilityfor Oil
Pollution from Vessels in Marine Environments, 3 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 267 (1991); Daniel
Kopec and Philip Peterson, Note, Crude Legislation: Liability and Compensation Under the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 597 (1992); Elizabeth R. Millard, Note,
Anatomy of an Oil Spill: The Exxon Valdez and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 18 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 331 (1993).
19. OPA requires that the President ensure the "effective and immediate removal of a
discharge, and mitigation or prevention of a substantial threat of a discharge" in conformity
with the National Contingency Plan. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 4210(a), 33 U.S.C. §
1321(c) (1994). Vessels must also maintain a contingency plan that outlines responses in
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sections most relevant to this Comment are in Title IV: Prevention and
Removal and the state liability law savings clause of section 1018 of Public
Law 101-380.21 The ambiguous statutory language of these sections,
however, raises questions over concurrent state and federal regulation.
This overlap was the primary issue in the Intertanko case.
1. Oil Spill Prevention
Oil spill prevention under OPA falls into four broad categories: vessel
traffic systems, vessel manning requirements, illegal drug and alcohol
testing, and vessel construction standards. A fifth prevention strategy,
Prevention Through People, exists, though it is not a part of OPA regula-
tion.
a. Vessel Traffic Systems
The vessel traffic system is a traffic system designed to increase safety
by monitoring various aspects of moving vessels, such as speed, location,
direction, and time to a nearby hazard, in busy ports.' The systems can
specify times of vessel movement,' routing schemes,24 set speed, draft
limitations and operating conditions,' and restrict certain vessels from
the event of an oil spill. See also Wilkinson, supra note 18; Millard, supra note 18.
20. Much has been written on the development of OPA elsewhere. See generally
Michael P. Donaldson, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Reaction and Response, 3 VILL.
ENvTL. L. 283 (1992); Antonio J. Rodriguerze & Paul A.C. Jaffe, The Oil Pollution Act
of 1990, 15 TUL. L.J. 1 (1990); Wilkinson, supra note 18; Gregg L. McCurdy, Comment,An
Overview of OPA 1990 and its Relationship to Other Laws, 5 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 243 (1993);
and Cynthia Carney Johnson, Note, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Long Time Coming,
2 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 59 (1990).
21. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was enacted through Public Law 101-380 in 1990.
Title IV contains oil spill prevention requirements. Title IV was codified by amending
various sections of existing legislation, contained primarily in Title 46 of the U.S. Code.
Section 1018 is codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1994).
22. Damon L. Vickers, Comment, Deterrence or Prevention - Two Means of
Environmental Protection: An Analysis of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and Oregon Senate
Bill 242, 28 WILLAMErE L. REV. 405, 415 (1992). Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 4107, 33
U.S.C. § 1223(a).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a)(4)(A).
24. Id. § 1223(a)(4)(B).
25. Id. § 1223(a)(4)(C).
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hazardous areas.26 The Secretary of Transportation can also require vessels
to have certain navigation and communication equipment.2 7 Compliance
is required for tankers.28
b. Vessel Manning Requirements
Since the 1950s, technology has enabled increasingly large tankers to
operate with smaller crews.2 9 OPA addresses this problem by establishing
minimum crew requirements. 30 The standards set the maximum number of
hours a person can work. Crew members (unlicensed employees) are
limited to working fifteen hours per twenty-four hour day or thirty-six
hours out of seventy-two.3' The Secretary of Transportation was directed
to do a study to determine the appropriate number of crew on tankers and
appropriate qualifications.32
c. Illegal Drug and Alcohol Testing
Congress amended the National Driver Register to allow the federal
licensing authority (Coast Guard) to access the information to investigate
for drug and alcohol violations on driving records of licensees and those
applying for licenses.33 It mandates that the Secretary test people who
apply for a license or license renewal under the provisions for illegal drug
use. 34 People who hold a license are required to submit to "periodic,
random, reasonable cause, and post accident testing," for alcohol and illegal
drug use.35 Licensees are also subject to testing for illegal drug use before
employment.36 If a licensee is found to be in violation of this section, their
26. Id. § 1223(a)(4)(D).
27. Id. § 1223(a)(3).
28. Id. § 1223(a)(2).
29. Vickers, supra note 22, at 416.
30. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 4106 (foreign tankers), 46 U.S.C. § 9101(a) (1994); Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 § 4114 (tank vessel manning), 46 U.S.C. §§ 3703 note, 7502,8101(a),
9102, 9102(a).
31. 46 U.S.C. § 8104(n).
32. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 4111(a), (b)(1)-(3), 46 U.S.C. § 3703. This study has
not yet been completed.
33. 46 U.S.C. § 7101(g).
34. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 4101, 46 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7302. This applies only to
U.S. officers.
35. Id. § 4103(a)(2), 46 U.S.C. § 7702(c)(2).
36. Id. Public Law 101-380 § 4103(a)(2), codified by amending 46 U.S.C. § 7102.
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license can be suspended or revoked, or, if applying for a license, not
issued.37
d. Vessel Construction Standards
The final category of OPA requirements concerns tanker construction
standards. The most controversial provision requires double hulls on
tankers.38 This section sets a timetable for requiring double hulls, based on
tanker size and age.39 The Secretary was first required to conduct a study
to determine the appropriate plating thickness for tankers,' then to
promulgate minimum standards. 1
e. Prevention Through People
Prevention Through People (PTP) is the latest idea by the Coast Guard
to reduce accidents from all types of vessels.42 The idea behind PTP is to
create a new safety-minded culture between industry and the government
through non-regulatory means.43 The program was initiated to address the
finding that about eighty percent of marine accidents, and eighty-four to
eighty-eight percent of tanker accidents, are caused by human error. 4
Fatigue, inadequate pilot-crew coordination, and deficient technical
knowledge, especially with radar, are the primary contributors. 45 Under
PT, corporate management must demonstrate its commitment to safety.46
37. 46 U.S.C. § 7703.
38. Vickers, supra note 22, at 417. Double hulls are required by 46 U.S.C. § 3703a.
39. 46 U.S.C. § 3703a.
40. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 4109,46 U.S.C. § 3703 note. See 46 C.F.R. pts. 30-32
(1998).
41. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 4109,46 U.S.C. § 3703 note.
42. This program is not required under OPA.
43. Andrew' 'Guest, Initiative Stresses Human Error Elements and Non-Regulatory
Approach, LLOYD'S LISTINT'L 16, Nov. 23, 1995, available in 1995 WL 9976927; John E.
Veentjer, Commanding Officer's Comments, MSO/GROuP PHILADELPHIA NEWSLETTER,
March 1996 (visited Nov. 8, 1996) <http:llwww.dot.gov/dotinfo/uscg/d5/msophili/mar_
news.txt>.
44. Veentjer, supra note 43; A U.S. Report Searchesfor Reasons Behind the Mistakes
That Cause So Many Marine Casualties, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L at 5, Dec. 5, 1995, available
in 1995 WL 9977589.
45. Guest, supra note 43. See also Ken Cottrill, Safety Focuses on Seafarer, TRAFIC
WORLD, Feb. 3, 1997, at 31, available in 1998 WL 8975507.
46. Veentjer, supra note 43.
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It also requires the company to promote safety through "company
procedures, processes, quality assurance, communications and feedback.
4 7
To encompass varying conditions, the created culture is supposed to
address a number of the factors impairing human behavior, such as,
weather, conditions on the vessel, port facilities, and waterway
conditions.48
2. State Law Saving Clause
OPA explicitly preserves for states the right to determine liability limits
for oil spills, above those proscribed by OPA.49 It is this issue that divided
the House and Senate and was responsible for delaying comprehensive oil
spill legislation for fifteen years." The clause states that OPA shall not
preempt state law regarding liability or other requirements with respect to
"the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State."5' This has
been interpreted by the court as not preempting state oil pollution control
measures generally.5 2 However, the House Conference Report53 to the Act
states that OPA does not disturb the United States Supreme Court holding
of Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.'
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1994). The meaning of this clause was litigated in International
Ass'n of Independent Tanker Owners v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996) aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, International Ass'n of Tanker Owners v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053 (9"'
Cir. 1998), reh'g en banc denied, 159 F.3d 1220 (9"' Cir. 1998); see infra notes 162-199 and
accompanying text for discussion of this case.
50. Wilkinson, supra note 18, at 221.
51. 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a)(1)(A).
52. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Lowry, 947 F.Supp. 1484. See also
Laurie L. Crick, The Washington BAP Standards: A Case Study in Aggressive Tanker
Regulation, J. MAR. L & COM. 641 (1996) (arguing that most of the standards are
constitutional); Marva Jo Wyatt, Navigating the Limits of State Spill Regulations: How Far
Can they Go? 8 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 1 (1995) (giving a thorough analysis of preemption law
concerning Washington's regulations and arguing that they should be constitutional);
Michael P. Mullahy, Note, States' Rights and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Sea of
Confusion? 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 607 (1996) (arguing that the emergency towing package
might be the only Washington standard unconstitutional); but see Robert E. Falvey, Note
and Comment, A Shot Across the Bow: Rhode Island's Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and
ControlAct, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIV. L. REv. 363 (1997) (arguing that Rhode Island's law
is "constitutionally indefensible").
53. H. CoNF. REP. No. 101-653, at 122 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779,
800.
54. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
State Incentive Based Oil Tanker Regulation
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. is the seminal case defining federal
preemption of state oil spill prevention legislation. Ray concerned a
challenge to a Washington State law setting certain requirements for tanker
design, size, tug boat, and movement of tankers on Puget Sound.5 The law
suit was initiated by various oil industry concerns, collectively known as
"ARCO," who claimed that the law was unconstitutional because it was
preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution, and that the law interfered with
federal regulation of foreign affairs.56 Of the three requirements chal-
lenged, the Court found two unconstitutional because they were preempted
by federal legislation.' The third was held constitutional because it was
offered as an alternative to a tug escort.
In toto, the safety features provision was found constitutional. 8 The
Washington legislation established an option of either complying with
minimum design requirements or being under the escort of a tug boat.59
55. Id. at 155.
56. Id. at 156. The Supremacy Clause is embodied in Article VI, clause 2 of the U.S.
Constitution; the Commerce Clause is in Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the U.S.
Constitution.
57. The first requirement addressed by the Court was the requirement that enrolled and
registered vessels over 50,000 dead weight tons (DWT) take on a pilot while navigating
Puget Sound. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. at 158. Vessels "engaged in domestic
or coastwise trade or used for fishing" are enrolled. Id. (quoting Douglas v. Seacoast
Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977)). Vessels engaged in foreign trade are registered. Id.
The Court determined that requiring enrolled tankers to take on a pilot was preempted
because it conflicted with the language of two federal statutes. Id. at 159. Because the two
statutes were limited in their applicability to coastwise vessels, the pilot requirement was
valid for enrolled vessels. Id.
The second provision of Washington's tanker law found to be unconstitutional was the
prohibition of any tanker over 125,000 DWT from entering Puget Sound. Id. at 173. This
provision was found unconstitutional because the Court determined that this area of
regulation was already occupied by federal activities. Id. at 174. It was determined that the
Coast Guard had addressed this issue when it promulgated regulations concerning the size
of vessels that could transit Rosario Strait. Id. at 174-75. The Coast Guard rule stipulated
that one vessel over 70,000 DWT could transit the Strait in good weather, and in bad
weather, vessels were limited to approximately 40,000 DWT. Id. at 175.
58. The provision applied to oil tankers between 40,000 and 125,000 DWT. Id.
59. ld. at 160. The specific design requirements were:
(a) Shaft horsepower in the ratio of one horsepower to each two and one-half
deadweight tons; and
(b) Twin screws; and
(c) Double bottoms, underneath all oil and liquid cargo compartments; and
(d) Two radars in working order and operating, one of which must be collision
avoidance radar, and
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The Court, however, determined that standing alone, the design require-
ments were invalid.'
Despite this determination, the Court held that "enrolled and registered
vessels must ... comply with the provision of the Tanker Law that requires
tug escorts for tankers over 40,000 DWT that do no satisfy the design
provisions."6 Thus, the tug escort provision, standing alone, was held not
to be preempted and was a valid exercise of state jurisdiction.62
Of particular importance is the interaction between the preempted
design requirements and the non-preempted tug escort requirement.
Because Washington gave tankers a choice, one of which was a valid
exercise of state authority, both sets of criteria were, as a whole, a valid
option. In finding this, the Court said "[g]iven the validity of a general rule
prescribing tug escorts for all tankers, Washington is also privileged, in so
far as the Supremacy Clause is concerned, to waive the rule for tankers
having specific design characteristics."'63
The provision was also determined to be valid under the Commerce
Clause.6 This was in spite of ARCO's argument that the regulation
indirectly regulated the prohibited area of design.65 In so holding, the Court
said:
the provision may be viewed as simply a tug-escort requirement
since it does not have the effect of forcing compliance with the
design specifications set forth in the provision.... So viewed, it
becomes apparent that the Commerce Clause does not prevent a
(e) Such other navigational position location systems as may be prescribed from time
to time by the board of pilotage commissioners ....
Id.
60. Id. at 160-61. The Court made this finding for a couple of reasons. The Court
determined that the Congressional intent of the federal legislation was to ensure uniform
national design standards, and that enforcing Washington's law would frustrate this
intention. Id. at 163, 165. The Court also found that the stated purposes of the federal
legislation conflicted and overlapped with that of Washington. Id. at 165.
61. Id. at 169 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 170. The tug escort requirement was not preempted, because the Secretary
had not promulgated any such requirements. Id. at 170-71.
63. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 173 (1978).
64. Id. at 180. The provision also did not violate the federal government's authority
to regulate foreign affairs. Id. The Court viewed the tug requirement as having "insignifi-
cant international consequences." Id. Instead of looking at the intention of the provision
as coercing design requirements upon tankers, the Court saw the provision only as a tug
escort requirement. Id.
65. Id. at 179.
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State from enacting a regulation of this type.... Nor does it
appear from the record that the requirement impedes the free and
efficient flow of interstate and foreign commerce, for the cost of
the tug escort for a 120,000 DWT tanker is less than one cent per
barrel of oil and the amount of oil processed at Puget Sound
refineries has not declined as a result of the provision's enforce-
ment.6
States are also allowed to "impose additional... requirements, or to
determine the amount of, any civil or criminal penalty for any violation of
law" under the state law savings clause.67 This allows for more than just
increased liability. "Other requirements" can be interpreted as encompass-
ing requirements that can either increase or decrease liability; or as in
Intertanko, prevention regulations.
Taken together, these requirements can enable states to set the criteria
under which a tanker spilling oil into the marine environment will be
criminally and civilly liable. It also allows states to impose punitive
damages for oil spills.
C. The Future of OPA
In 1996 and early 1997 there was increased activity in both Houses of
Congress concerning amendments to OPA. In the Senate, Senator Chafee
of Rhode Island introduced S. 1730: the "Oil Spill Prevention and Response
Act.' 68 One of the principal reasons for Senator Chafee's involvement was
the January 19, 1996 North Cape oil spill off the Rhode Island coast.69 The
bill would provide incentives to companies that switch from single-hull
vessels to double-hull vessels before the 2015 deadline set by OPA.7° The
incentive would be a reduction in the exceptions to the liability cap
authorized under OPA.71 Until the Coast Guard implements rules for
66. Id. at 179-80 (citations omitted).
67. H. CONF. REP. No. 101-653, supra note 53, at 122; 33 U.S.C. § 2718(c) (1994).
68. 142 CONG. REc. S4805-02 (daily ed. May 7, 1996). The bill is reproduced at 1996
CONG. U.S. S.1730, 104th Cong., 2nd Session. The bill also addresses response require-
ments.
69. S. REP. No. 104-292, at 2 (1996).
70. 142 CONG. REC. S4804-02. See generally Tammy M. Alcock, Comment, "Ecology
Tankers" and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A History of Efforts to Require Double Hulls
on Oil Tankers, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 97 (1992).
71. 142 CONG. REC. S4804-02, 104th Cong. § 102 (1996). Liability is not limited
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single-hull vessel operations, S.1730 would impose increased regulations
on the vessels. Single-hull tanker vessels would have to maintain minimum
under-keel clearances when entering and leaving port.72 One of the primary
aims of the bill is to encourage the Coast Guard to issue regulations that
should have been issued nearly five years ago. 73 Although Congress did not
approve this bill as introduced, it did approve a watered-down version
through various parts of the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996."4
III. WASHINGTON'S BAP STANDARDS AND THE INTERTANKO LAWSUIT
As more areas are opened up to drilling in Alaska, it is likely that the
amount of oil being brought into Washington refineries will increase. With
this in mind, Washington enacted strict prevention regulations to help
reduce the likelihood of an Exxon Valdez magnitude oil spill in its waters."
These provisions were challenged by a tanker industry group, Intertanko,
in 1996. The federal district court summarily decided that the regulations
were constitutional. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court determined
under OPA:
[I]f the incident was proximately caused by-
(A) gross negligence or willful misconduct of, or
(B) the violation of an applicable Federal safety, construction, or operating
regulation by, the responsible party, an agent or employee of the responsible party, or
a person acting pursuant to a contractual relationship with the responsible party
(except where the sole contractual arrangement arises in connection with carriage by
a common carrier by rail).
33 U.S.C. § 2704(c) (1994).
72. S.1730, 104th Cong. § 101(b)(ii) (1996).
73. 142 CONG. REC. S4804-02 (daily ed. May 7, 1996). The House also discussed
amending OPA. Representative Menendez introduced H.R. 238 on January 7, 1997. H.R.
238, 105th Cong. (1997). This bill was very similar to S.1730.
74. Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-324, 110 Stat. 3901
(1996).
75. Regulation and the Environment, 75(86) PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS 3 (May 5, 1997).
Spills in Washington and Alaskan waters include: a tanker spill off Port Angeles, 1985,
239,000 gallons; a tanker spill along coast of Grays Harbor, 1988, 231,000 gallons; two
refinery spills, total of 190,000 gallons, 1991. Id. Between June 1992 and June 1996, there
were a reported 18 oil spills that ranged in magnitude from 25 to 10,000 gallons, and 86
spills in total. Id. Eighty percent of the spills were blamed on human error. Id. Between
1987 and 1991, from spills greater than 10,000 gallons, a total of 327,000 gallons were
spilled in Washington. Id. Between January 1992 and June 1996, only 72,000 gallons were
spilled. Id. The state's Office of Marine Safety was fully funded for the latter time period.
Id. With this type of information, it is easy to see why Washington wanted to enact
regulations specifically addressing human error.
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that the regulations determined to be operational were constitutional,76
while those that were determined to be design or construction standards
were unconstitutional.'
A. State Oil Spill Prevention Regulation
State regulation of oil spill prevention can generally be put into two
categories: stringent and minimal.78 The stringent category comprises
states with comprehensive oil spill prevention regulations. The minimal
category comprises those states with little or no oil spill prevention
regulations.
76. The court determined that accident reporting, watch practices, navigation
procedures, engineering procedures, pre-arrival tests and inspections, emergency procedures,
rules against altering or destroying records, training programs, illicit drugs and alcohol use,
personnel evaluations, work hours, language requirements, training records for crew
members, management, and advance notice of entry and safety reports were all operational
requirements and not design and construction requirements. International Ass'n of Indep.
Tanker Owners v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053 (9h Cir. 1998), reh'g en banc denied, 159 F.3d
1220 (9"h Cir. 1998).
77. The requirements that tankers have global positioning system receivers, two radar
systems, and emergency towing equipment were the only requirements determined to be
design and construction standards. Id.
78. The discussion does not consider remediation, compensation, or liability regulations
to be prevention oriented. To be considered prevention oriented, the regulations must
contain affirmative actions which must be taken that could prevent oil from entering the
marine environment initially. Examples of such regulations include: vessel traffic systems,
construction standards, personnel requirements, and required technology. However, the
author makes nojudgment as to whether the various regulations would actually decrease the
frequency or severity oil spills. Unlimited liability is not considered a prevention regulation
because no affirmative actions must be undertaken by the vessel operator or owner. Also,
although unlimited liability might scare some vessels into taking affirmative steps, vessels
that accidentally discharge oil into the environment will be equally penalized regardless of
whether they took additional steps to prevent an oil spill or whether they took none. Because
of this, unlimited liability is not being considered a prevention regulation.
Numerous articles have outlined various state's oil spill legislation. See generally James
E. Beaver, James N. Butler, III & Susan E. Myster, Stormy Seas? Analysis of New Oil
Pollution Laws in the West Coast States, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 791 (1994) (discussing
the laws of: Alaska, California, Oregon, and Washington); Michael P. Donaldson, The Texas
Response to Oil Pollution: Which Law to Apply? 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 533 (1994); John D.
Edgcomb, Responding to an Oil Spill in California - The Impact of OPA 1990 and OSPRA,
5 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 389 (1993); Gary V. Perko, Spilloverfrom the Exxon Valdez: North
Carolina's New Offshore Oil Spill Statute, 68 N.C.L. REv. 1214 (1990); Stephen L. Sawyer,
Oil Spill Response: California's Perspective, 7 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 59 (1994); Vickers, supra
note 22; and Falvey, supra note 52.
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The stringent category consists of just three states. Of the three,
Washington State is the leader, with California and Rhode Island in its
wake. 79 Briefly stated, these plans provide steps to decrease oil spills by
supplementing and enhancing OPA. Rhode Island's plan takes the
additional step of imposing construction standards on barges. Rhode Island
requires that either double hulls or a tug escort be used in state waters
during times of limited visibility."0 Reportedly, other coastal states are not
currently thinking of implementing such regulations."'
Although many states have an oil spill act with the word "prevention"
in it, most do not actually provide for active prevention measures. This
omission is in spite of legislative findings that oil spills present "a real and
substantial threat to the public health and welfare, to the environment, the
wildlife and aquatic life, and to the economy of the state."' 2 Most of these
plans do provide for oil spill contingency plans and liability schemes.
1. The Washington State Example
Washington State has taken a proactive position regarding prevention
of tanker oil spills. 3 Washington recognized that the best way to remedy
an oil spill is to prevent it from occurring. The scheme Washington
established is referred to as the "Best Achievable Protection Standards For
Tankers" (BAP standards).' The standards incorporate operating pro-
79. See Washington, WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 317-21-010 to 317-21-910 (1996);
California, CAL. Gov'TCODE §§ 8670.1 to 8670.72 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); and Rhode
Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 46-12.5.1-1 to 46-12.5.1-15 (1996).
80. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.5-24(a). The limited visibility restriction applies only until
January 1,2001. After that all non-self-propelled tank vessels must have either a double hull
or a tug escort. Id. § 46-12.5-24(b). At least one commentator believes such construction
standards are beyond the ability of states to regulate. Falvey, supra note 52. The proposed
plan could be adapted to provide a way to have otherwise preempted design and construction
standards enacted into valid, non-preempted, law.
81. Alan Abrams, Federal Tanker Laws Hold Sway, J. CoM., Jan. 9, 1997 at B2.
82. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2453(A) (West 1997). This quote was used as an example.
Similar findings are present in many states' legislation.
83. Washington was the first of the three to impose such stringent standards.
Washington design regulations were also at issue in the late 1970s in Ray. Of the three
today, Rhode Island's regulations go the farthest by imposing design and construction
standards.
84. WASH.ADMIN.CODE §§ 317-21-010 to 317-21-910(1996). Effective June7,1995;
adopted pursuant to authority granted by WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 43.211.030, 88.46.040
(West 1996 & Supp. 1998). Because the actual standards are located in Washington's
Administrative Code, references will be to it instead of statutory language that only sets up
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cedures, personnel policies, management oversight, and technology
requirements. 5
Washington's oil spill prevention regulations were adopted to reduce
the risk of an oil spill from a tanker and to "[e]ncourage the development
and use of procedures and technology that increase the safety of marine
transportation and protection of the state's natural resources. 86 These
requirements are not voluntary, they are required.' They apply to all
tankers entering Washington waters.88 The tanker must have an oil spill
prevention plan in accord with the regulations. 9
Washington's regulations are generally stricter versions of OPA
requirements.' For example, Washington's drug and alcohol testing
applies to all crew members and officers aboard domestic and foreign
vessels, not just officers on domestic vessels as under OPA.91 Washington
also requires an extra officer on the bridge during periods of restricted
visibility.92 Washington's manning requirements, such as language and
training, are also stricter than under OPA.93
broad guidelines.
85. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 317-21-010 to 317-21-910.
86. Id. § 317-21-010.
87. Id. § 317-21-020.
88. Id. § 317-21-020(1). The regulations do not apply to a tanker that is determined
to be in distress by the U.S. Coast Guard. Id. § 317-21-020(2).
89. Id. § 317-21-020(3). The specific requirements for tankers are located in Part 3 of
the chapter. The regulations also include standards for tank barges. Id. § 317-21-300 (Part
4).
90. This paragraph highlights only three of the many differences. See infra notes 91-93
and accompanying text.
91. Neil Modie, ShippersAttack State Oil Spill Law Lawsuit Is Filed In Federal Court,
SEATtL POsT-INTELiGENcER, July 20, 1995, at BI, available in 1995 WL 4318178;
compare WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-21-235 with Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-380 §§ 4101-4103, 104 Stat. 484, 509-11 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 46 U.S.C.).
92. Compare WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-21-200(1)(a) with 33 C.F.R. § 164.13(c)
(1998).
93. Sandi Doughton, Critics Threaten Oil-Spill Prevention Efforts / Lawsuit,
Lawmakers Target Safety Office as Memories of Disasters Dim, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma,
Wash.), Dec. 17, 1995, at Al.
285
286 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:271
a. Requirements While Transiting Washington Waters
Any tanker transiting Washington waters must have at least two
licensed deck officers, a lookout, and a helmsman. 4 During periods of
restricted visibility an additional licensed deck officer is required. 5
Moreover, lookouts, with a reliable method of communicating with the
officer in charge on the bridge must be posted in locations that allow sight
and hearing of all navigational hazards and other vessels.9 6 A log entry
must be made when it is determined that visibility is restricted and when a
crew member assumes watch duty.97
A written voyage plan must be developed before entering Washington
waters and must address various local conditions, weather, and emergency
procedures.98 This plan must be adhered to, unless local conditions prompt
the vessel master to deviate.99 While transiting Washington waters, the
tanker's position must be constantly monitored and recorded every fifteen
minutes using "all appropriate navigational aids."'' The vessel's steering
gyrocompass and magnetic compass must be compared frequently while in
state waters. 101
Tankers that do not have gear to automatically switch between standard
generators and stand-by generators must have stand-by generators operating
that will be able to immediately assume the electrical load in the event of
an emergency.0 2 Unless the steering gear flat is "monitored by closed
circuit television or other acceptable monitoring system," it must be
inspected hourly.0 3 If the tanker has scoop injection cooling systems,"
94. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-21-200(1). A state-licensed pilot can be substituted for
a deck officer. Id.
95. Id. § 317-21-200(1)(a). "Restricted visibility" is defined as visibility limited
"because of fog, mist, precipitation, sand storms or other conditions limiting visibility." Id.
§ 317-21-060(8).
96. Id. § 317-21-200(1)(b), (c).
97. Id. § 317-21-200(1)(a), (d).
98. Id. § 317-21-205(2)(a)-(j).
99. Id. § 317-21-205(2). A standardized plan can be used for consecutive voyages, if
updated prior to entering state waters. Id.
100. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-21-205(1) (1996).
101. Id. § 317-21-205(3).
102. Id. § 317-21-210(1).
103. Id. § 317-21-210(2).
104. Many of the terms mentioned in the text are undefined, but nevertheless used, by
the Washington standards.
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they must be secured "at least six hours before operating in state waters."' 0 5
In addition, the "main engines must be operating to capacity on fuel used
for maneuvering before operating in state waters. '' 6
Before entering or getting underway in state waters, a tanker must
complete numerous tests and inspections on various parts of the vessel, and
log the results. The navigational equipment must be inspected. 7 The
primary and standby generators,0 8 steering systems,'O° engines,"0
lubrication oil pumps,"' and, heavy oil pumps" 2 must be tested and ready
for use. The main engine lubricating and fuel oil systems must be cleaned,
purged, and ready for use." 3 Sufficient fuel to transit must be transferred
to the main engine settler or service tanks or both."4 For motor-driven
tankers, the main and stand-by engine cooling water systems," 5 intake air
blowers," 6 starting and control air tanks,"7 and the air compressors" 8 must
be ready for use.
The vessel master must devise and post crew duties in the event of fire,
orders to abandon ship, man overboard and oil spill response." 9 Proce-
dures that should be followed in the event of a collision, grounding, hull
breach, loss of steering, propulsion or electrical power, or a gyrocompass
malfunction must also be established in writing by the vessel master. 20
Preparations for emergency towing, responding to loss of throttle control
and severe weather that poses a risk to crew or vessel must also be written
by the vessel's master. 2'
105. WASH. ADMiN. CODE § 317-21-210(3).
106. Id. § 317-21-210(4).
107. Id. § 317-21-215(1). This includes compasses, speed monitoring gear, radars, and
directional finders. Id. Additionally, "[c]ompass, range, and bearing errors must be logged
in the deck log and posted on the bridge to be used by the bridge team." Id.
108. Id. § 317-21-215(2).
109. Id. § 317-21-215(3).
110. Id. § 317-21-215(4).
111. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-21-215(5) (1996).
112. Id. § 317-21-215(6).
113. Id. § 317-21-215(7).
114. Id. § 317-21-215(9).
115. Id. § 317-21-215(9)(a).
116. Id. § 317-21-215(9)(b).
117. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-21-215(9)(c) (1996).
118. Id. § 317-21-215(9)(d).
119. Id. § 317-21-220(1).
120. Id. § 317-21-220(2).
121. Id. § 317-21-220(3).
287
288 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:271
While in state waters, an owner or operator must ensure that no crew
members consume or are under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs
while aboard the tanker.' This includes pre-screening of potential
employees to prevent those likely from engaging in such activities from
being employed. 23 After a collision, grounding, fire, or other incidence,
"all crew members who may have been directly involved" must be tested
for drug and alcohol use soon after the incidence. 24 All personnel must be
randomly tested.1
25
To help protect against accidents due to errors caused by fatigue, the
Washington BAP standards require that members of the crew not work for
more than fifteen hours out of twenty-four, and that they only work thirty-
six out of seventy-two hours, except in an emergency. 26 An officer cannot
assume navigational watch duty unless (s)he has been off duty for at least
six of the last twelve hours.'27
Required technology includes navigation equipment and an emergency
towing system. 12 The required navigation equipment includes a global
positioning system (GPS) and two separate radar systems, one of which
must be equipped with an automated radar piloting aid. 129 The emergency
towing system must be present on the bow and stem of the tanker.'30 The
system must be able to withstand sustained wave heights of at least
eighteen feet, 13 and be deployable in under fifteen minutes by two crew
members from a safe location.1
32
The above discussion highlights some of the requirements that a tanker
must comply with while underway in Washington waters. The BAP
standards are not so much per se operational requirements as they are
minimum criteria that have to be addressed in a written pollution preven-
tion plan. The requirements discussed below pertain to administrative
122. Id. § 317-21-235(1).
123. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-21-235(3)(a) (1996).
124. Id. § 317-21-235(3)(b).
125. Id. § 317-21-235(3)(d).
126. Id. § 317-21-245(1). These are the same requirements as under OPA. Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 § 4114(b), 46 U.S.C. § 8104(n) (1994). The state perhaps enacted these
requirements to give state enforcement officers jurisdiction.
127. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-21-245(3).
128. Id. § 317-21-265.
129. Id. § 317-21-265(1).
130. Id. § 317-21-265(2).
131. Id. § 317-21-265(2)(a), (b).
132. Id. § 317-21-265(3).
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requirements and requirements that would be addressed while not in
Washington waters.
b. Personnel Policies
The personnel policies section of the BAP standards are divided into
five main categories."' These categories are: illicit drug and alcohol use;
personnel evaluation; 3' work hours;'36 language requirements; 137 and,
record keeping responsibility.13 1 The first category, illicit drug and alcohol
use, prohibits anyone who might have any responsibility on the tanker
while in state waters from consuming either. 39 The tests are applicable
during three stages of employment. First, the tests must be designed to
prevent a person from being employed who is likely to use such substances
while in state waters.Y The testing program also must randomly test all
personnel, 4' and especially test personnel for whom there is a reason to
suspect such use. 2 Additionally, any crew member who might have been
directly involved in a collision, grounding, or other accident must be tested
for such uses as soon as practicable after the event. 3
The second group of procedures involves personnel evaluations."'4 The
tanker's officers must monitor the fitness for duty of the crew. If it is
determined that a crew member is unfit for duty, (s)he must be promptly
removed." Any crew member under a contractual obligation with the
vessel in excess of six months must undergo a performance review
annually. The review should identify any training required so the person
can safely perform his/her job.'
133. Some of the requirements discussed in the text above are repeated in this section.
134. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-21-235.
135. Id. § 317-21-240.
136. Id. § 317-21-245.
137. Id. § 317-21-250.
138. Id. § 317-21-255.
139. Id. § 317-21-235(1).
140. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-21-235(3)(a) (1996).
141. Id. § 317-21-235(3)(c).
142. Id. § 317-21-235(3)(d).
143. Id. § 317-21-235(3)(b).
144. Id. § 317-21-240.
145. Id. § 317-21-240(1).
146. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-21-240(2) (1996).
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All officers must also be proficient in both English and the language
spoken by both subordinate officers and unlicensed crew members.'4 7 All
written policies must be in a language understood by officers and crew.'
The owner or operator is required to maintain detailed training records. 4 9
The owner or operator must also maintain work hour records. 50
The tanker must provide training for crew members in the use of "job-
specific equipment, installed technology, lifesaving equipment and
procedures, and oil spill response equipment and procedures..'' This must
be accomplished within three years of the start of employment or effective
date of Washington's standards. 5 ' New crew members must be provided
with additional training designed to familiarize them with the vessel and
job-specific duties. '53 Fire drills must be conducted weekly,' 4and abandon
ship drills must be conducted monthly. 55 On board drills for oil spill
response, emergency steering and towing, loss of propulsion and electrical
power, and man overboard, must be done quarterly.
56
c. Management Oversight
Owners and operators of tankers must monitor vessel operations, and
establish a policy to do so that conforms to various international standards
for management practices. 57  The policies and procedures must be
147. Id. § 317-21-250(1).
148. Id. § 317-21-250(2).
149. Id. § 317-21-255(1).
150. Id. § 317-21-255(2).
151. Id. § 317-21-230.
152. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-21-230(1) (1996).
153. Id. § 317-21-230(2). Training must be refreshed every five years. Id. § 317-21-
230(4).
154. Id. § 317-21-230(5)(a).
155. Id. § 317-21-230(5)(b).
156. Id. § 317-21-230(5)(c).
157. Id. § 317-21-260. The international management standards and requirements that
must be complied with include:
(a) The International Ship Managers Association for complying with the Code of
Ship-Management Standards;
(b) Det Norske Veritas for complying with the Safety/Environmental Protection
management system;
(c) Lloyd's Register for complying with the Quality Management System; or
(d) The vessel's nation of registry for complying with the International Maritime
Organization's Safety Management Code.
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established, written, and actually performed.' 8 They, include lines of
command, a preventative and planned maintenance program, and surveys
of various parts of the tanker.159
d. Analysis
Washington's regulations seem to be common sense regulations. What
is not known is whether the requirements would actually do much to
prevent oil spills or reduce their severity. For example, do all of the pre-
arrival tests and inspections really need to be conducted so often? Or,
would monthly or semi-annual tests be sufficient? States and the federal
government are seldom concerned about the economic realities of
businesses or the cost effectiveness of regulations. Before states or the
federal government require businesses to adopt costly procedures, they
should be reasonably sure that the regulations are effective and needed.
Although it is doubtful that many states or the federal government will
embrace this attitude, establishing regulatory schemes such as the one
proposed could provide an adequate alternative.'" ° This is especially true
if these regulations are used as an interim plan until proper studies are
completed.
Washington's BAP standards impose many requirements not otherwise
required under federal or international law upon tanker owners and
operators. They also impose many administrative requirements on state
agencies, such as recording information and pre-hiring screening. This has
left the entire program open to attack by state legislators that functionally
eliminates the effectiveness of the program. Washington legislators have
attempted to disband the agency in charge and transfer the duties to another
agency.'6' The legislature has also attempted to cut the agency's budget.
Either or both of these would severely limit the effectiveness of the
standards.
Id. § 317-21-260(2).
158. WASH. ADmN. CODE § 317-21-260 (1996).
159. Id. § 317-21-260.
160. Federal government agencies are required to submit cost-benefit analyses of major
proposed regulations to the Office of Management and Budget. Eric T. Mikkelson,
Comment, Earning Green for Turning Green: Executive Order 12,291 and Market-Driven
Environmental Regulation, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 243, 246-47 (1993).
161. Doughton, supra note 93.
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Although environmental groups seem fairly happy with the standards,
the oil industry is not. The oil industry is concerned about having to
comply with regulations that vary by state. Many shippers might decide it
is not worth shipping oil in United States waters, at least at reasonable
rates.
Washington's regulations do not, on the whole, address construction
standards. This is likely a result of Ray, a case with which Washington is
all too familiar. A review of the literature on the subject does not reveal
any commentator arguing that construction standards would be constitu-
tional. Washington likely came to the same conclusion. It is to this
problem, and the belief that some states desire to enact design and
construction standards, that the proposal in this paper is addressed.
B. BAP Standards a Valid Exercise of State Power
Washington's recent statutes and regulations were challenged by Inter-
tanko. 61 Intertanko sought an order declaring certain Washington BAP
standards unconstitutional. At issue was "the extent to which Washington
State may protect its marine environment by regulating oil tankers in the
areas of operations, personnel, management, technology and information
reporting."
161
Intertanko argued that the statutes and regulations were preempted by
federal statutes, regulations, and treaty obligations.' 6 Intertanko further
argued that the regulations violated the Foreign Affairs and Commerce
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. 165 To support its claim, Intertanko argued
162. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D.
Wash. 1996), affid in part, rev'd in part, International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v.
Locke, 148 F.3d 1053 (9' Cir. 1998), reh'g en banc denied, 159 F.3d 1220 (9' Cir. 1998).
Intertanko represents approximately 300 independent shipping companies, which comprise
about eighty percent of the world's independently owned oil tankers. Doughton, supra note
93.
163. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. at 1490.
164. Id. The laws and treaties that Intertanko argued preempted the Washington
regulations are: the Tank Vessel Act of 1936; Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972; Port
and Tanker Safety Act of 1978; Oil Pollution Act of 1990; International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea, 1974; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, 1973 and 1978 Protocol; International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978; and the International Regulation for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1973. Id. at 1489-90.
165. Id. at 1490.
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that the state law savings clause located in section 1018 of OPA 66 was
limited to preserving liability and compensation regulations and excluded
prevention regulations. 67
Washington argued that OPA envisioned and approves of states
enacting their own prevention policies. 68 The State believed that the
savings clause prohibits preemption of state regulations.
6 9
The court accepted Washington's interpretation of the clause for a
number of reasons. The court looked at the entire Act to consider the
meaning of the section. 70 The court stated that the language "this Act" in
the clause was broad.' Because the section applies broadly to "this Act,"
the court interpreted that language to include prevention regulations.'72 The
court did not accept Intertanko's assertion that interpreting the clause in
this way would upset international standards. The court reasoned that
because other parts of OPA contradict international standards, Congress
could not have been overly concerned with international uniformity.'73
The court found that the legislative history to OPA supported this
view. 74 To get around the citation of Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. in the
legislative history, the court reasoned that "[tihe citation to Ray may mean
that there was an intention not to eradicate the Court's holding that federal
law impliedly preempted state tanker design and construction
regulations."'7" Because the court determined that Washington's regula-
tions concern "tanker operations, personnel, management, technology and
information reporting[,]" they fell within the umbrella of the savings
clause.' 76
Intertanko also argued that the comprehensive federal scheme of tanker
regulation impliedly preempted Washington's regulations by not leaving
any room for state regulation. 77 This too was rejected by the court because
it had determined that the regulations were not design or construction
166. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 1018, 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1994).






173. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp at 1491.
174. Id
175. Id. at 1492 n.5.
176. Id. at 1492-93.
177. IM at 1492.
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standards, and thus preempted under Ray, but were valid "tanker opera-
tions, personnel, management, technology and information reporting"
standards to protect the environment.
78
The court did not adopt the argument that some of Washington's
regulations were expressly preempted by Coast Guard regulations because
the savings clause prohibits the Coast Guard from preempting state
regulations.1 79 This also was based on the court's determination that design
and construction standards were not involved.1
80
Intertanko argued that portions of the Washington regulations were
preempted by Coast Guard regulations to take effect in the future. These
regulations are the result of amendments to the International Convention on
Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers,
1978.81 Intertanko argued that the Washington regulations were preempted
because they would require similar regulations to become mandatory in
Washington before the federal regulations became effective.
8 2
The court rejected this argument for two reasons. First, the Washing-
ton regulations only require earlier implementation of similar federal
regulations. As such, compliance with the federal regulations will not only
be possible, but will be facilitated because of Washington's earlier
requirement. 8 1 Second, the savings clause, and how the court earlier
interpreted it, allows states to implement prevention regulations.'81
Intertanko's next argument was that the Washington regulations
violated the Commerce Clause because they directly regulated international
commerce.8 5 Because the court determined that the regulations were not
aimed at directly controlling international trade, but at protecting state
waters from oil spills, this view was not adopted by the court.' 6 The court
found the regulations did not indirectly burden international commerce
either. This was based on the relatively small costs associated with
178. Id. at 1495.
179. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. at 1496.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1497. The regulations included in this argument are: watch practices;
navigation practices; training requirements for crew; personnel evaluations; limits on hours




185. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. at 1498.
186. Id.
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compliance versus the yearly operating costs of a tanker and the costs
associated with an oil spill."s
The last major argument concerned a violation of the Foreign Affairs
clause of the U.S. Constitution. Intertanko claimed that the Washington
regulations interfered with international treaties and with the federal
government's ability to enter into such agreements.' The court reasoned
that this argument has only worked once in the past, and that Washington
was merely exercising its allowable police powers and therefore did not
violate the clause." 9
The court granted the state's motion for summary judgment for the
reason cited in the discussion above and the fact that the Intertanko case
was largely a question of law, not fact.19" The court concluded that
Washington's regulations "legitimately protect Washington's delicate and




The validity of Washington's regulations will likely be contested for
some time to come. Intertanko appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals."9 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held some of the
187 Id. at 1499. The court found that the required oil spill prevention plan would cost
about$12,000, and installing the emergency towing system would cost about $80,000. These
figures were compared to the yearly costs of operating a tanker of $13.6 to $19 million for
a U.S. tanker, $8.4 to $12 million for a foreign tanker, and the average cost of an oil spill in
Washington between 1984 and 1988 at $6.3 million, with an additional $2.2 to $8.1 million
in resource damage. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1500.
191. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. at 1500.
192. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053 (9" Cir.
1998), reh'g en banc denied, 159 F.3d 1220 (9" Cir. 1998).
The U.S. Department of Justice intervened in the case, because of the interaction between
Washington's regulations and international treaty obligations. U.S. to Fight a State's Rules
on Shipping, PLATT's OILGRAM NEws, April 30, 1997, at 2, available in 1997 WL 8878609.
The Department of Justice wanted the case remanded so that the court could determine
whether certain provisions of Washington's regulations invade federal territory. Id.
Opposition to these requirements was not limited to Intertanko or the Department of Justice.
The Washington legislature also appeared to oppose them. Doughton, supra note 93. The
state legislature has already tried to abolish the Office of Marine Safety, the agency
responsible for enforcing Washington's regulations. The political opposition to the Office
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challenged regulations to be operational in nature, and thus not preempted,
and a few to be preempted because they are design and construction
standards.
State regulations can be held unconstitutional because of federal
preemption in two circumstances. The first instance is when Congress
explicitly preempts state law.'93 In the Intertanko case, the court reasoned
that section 1018 prohibited the Coast Guard from preempting concurrent
state regulation.'94 In order to do this, the district court gave a very liberal
interpretation to section 1018. On appeal, the court reaffirmed this
holding.195
A second instance in which a state law can be preempted is when "the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject."'196 The court
summarily dismissed this claim.' 97 By rejecting the federal interest in
uniform regulation of oil tankers, the court left open the door to state
regulations that could conflict with those of other states or nations. This
policy is in direct contrast with general maritime law which, generally,
seeks uniformity within the nation and internationally. Although the Coast
Guard has been delinquent in promulgating required studies and regula-
tions, it may eventually comply with the requirements of OPA. When it
does, the federal scheme will be even more evasive. At that time, if not
before, state regulations might well be held to be preempted. On appeal, the
court looked to Congress' purpose in passing OPA to determine whether
the regulations were preempted, and determined that most were not.'98
wants to merge it with the Department of Ecology, to eliminate a double bureaucracy.
Proponents of the Office of Marine Safety say such a merger would weaken the programs
that it offers. In 1995, political maneuvering merged the two agencies, but a judge ruled the
procedure illegal. Although the Office was reestablished for 1996, its operating budget
could not be removed from the Department of Ecology. Id.
193. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. at 1496 (citing
Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)).
194. Id.
195. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1068.
196. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). This type of
preemption is referred to as implied field preemption. See also Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
197. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. at 1495.
198. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Locke, 148 F.3d at 1062.
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Either theory of preemption presents a possible ground for appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court."9 Indeed, the importance of the interests involved
makes such an appeal more than likely. It is for this reason that an alterna-
tive approach is being presented.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations presented here are an alternative to traditional
command-and-control legislation. The proposed legislation would allow
companies to utilize risk management analysis to determine whether the
proposed benefits outweigh the costs. As Rhode Island's recently adopted
regulations demonstrate, some states might not want to wait for the federal
government to adopt stricter construction and design standards. The
proposed plan could be a way to survive a preemption challenge and allow
states to adopt such requirements.
The proposed methodology is analogous to the role of corporate
compliance programs under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guide-
lines).2' To familiarize the reader with this role, a brief discussion of the
topic will ensue. The minimum requirements to enact such oil spill
prevention legislation will then be presented.
A. Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Corporate Compliance Programs
The Guidelines for corporations set up a convoluted system of adding,
subtracting, and multiplying various figures together to reach an appropri-
ate fine range.2 ' Although a complete discussion of this process is
unnecessary, the Guidelines provide that if an organization (corporation)
has in place an "effective program to prevent and detect violations of law"
before the violation occurs, the culpability score for the corporation will be
reduced.2"
199. Although not discussed in this paper, the regulations could potentially be held
unconstitutional because they violate the Commerce Clause or the Foreign Affairs Clause
of the Constitution.
200. Compliance programs are appropriate for various federal laws. See supra notes 201-
07 and accompanying text.
201. See U.S. SENTENCINGGUmE iEsMANUAL § 8A1.2 (1996); codified at 18 U.S.C.A
§ 8A1.2 (1996).
202. 18 U.S.C.A. § 8A1.2(b)(2)(D) applying 18 U.S.C.A § 8C2.5(f). For example, to
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The scheme under the Guidelines for corporate compliance programs
makes having a compliance program totally voluntary. It also makes
enforcement for the federal government easy. Because the compliance
program is voluntary and does not become functional under the law until
sentencing, enforcement officials do not have to review the program to
ensure its adequacy. That responsibility is left to the corporation.203 The
corporation also has the burden at sentencing to prove that it had an
adequate program in place before the violation.
For a compliance program to be determined adequate, it must meet a
number of minimum criteria. 4 The corporation must appoint a high-level
employee to administer the program and assume overall responsibility for
it.2"5 The program must be proactive in detecting violations." This can
require monitoring employees and testing their knowledge of the subject in
question. An adequate program does not ensure a corporation's fine will
be reduced.
Under the application notes to section 8A1.2, a corporation can lose the
beneficial effects of having an adequate program in place if a high-level
employee "participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the
offense. 2 °7 In such instances, the compliance program is deemed non-
functional. This places a duty or responsibility upon employees to enforce
the program on their own if they later wish to be able to use the compliance
program to reduce a fine.
determine a fine for a corporation convicted of an antitrust violation, a base fine must first
be determined. Id. § 8C2.4. This is usually about twenty percent of the volume of commerce
done by the corporation. GARY R. SPRATLING, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE CRIME
IN AMERICA: STRENGTHENING THE"GOOD CITIZEN" CORPORATION *3,available in 1995 WL
623784 (D.O.J.). The corporation's culpability score is then determined. 18 U.S.C.A. §
8C2.5. One of the factors that can reduce a corporation's culpability score, and thereby its
maximum and minimum multiplier figures, is an "effective program to prevent and detect
violations of law." Id. § 8A 1.2. The factors that make up such a program are located in 18
U.S.C.A. § 8A1.2 note (3)(k). The culpability score is then used to determine the minimum
and maximum multiplier. Id. U.S.C.A. § 8C2.6. The base fine amount is then multiplied
by the minimum and maximum multiplier numbers to determine the appropriate fine range.
Id. U.S.C.A. § 8C2.7. A number of additional factors are weighed to determine the ultimate
fine to be paid. Id. U.S.C.A. § 8A1.2.
203. Spratling, supra note 202.
204. 18 U.S.C.A. § 8C1.2 note (3)(k).
205. Id. § 8C1.2 note (3)(k)(2).
206. Id. § 8C1.2 note (3)(k)(3).
207. Id. § 8C2.5(f). This part of the discussion assumes that the compliance program
is otherwise adequate.
State Incentive Based Oil Tanker Regulation
B. Incentive Based Regulation
Incentive, or market, based regulation is not a new concept." 8 Since
the 1980s it has been gaining popularity and has generated considerable
literature. It has been discussed as a more effective and efficient way to
regulate environmental concerns.2" The most notable example of incentive
based regulation in the United States is emission trading under the Clean
Air Act.2"0 The advantages of incentive based regulation are perhaps best
highlighted by comparing them with traditional command-and-control
regulation.
Command-and-control regulating through best available control
technology has been criticized for a number of reasons. By mandating
specific requirements, regulations cannot be tailored to meet specific
conditions."' This also reduces innovation in technology development and
alternative methods.21 To avoid massive financial costs for existing
operations, the standards are usually more lenient for existing operations
than new ones. This approach disproportionally places the burden onto
new operations. It also requires a large bureaucracy to administer and
enforce.21 3
208. See generally Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmen-
tal Regulation: New Era from an Old Idea? 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991) (discussing what
incentive based regulation is and its use in environmental control). See also David Farrier,
Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives forManagement or Compensation for
Lost Expectations? 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 303 (1995) (advocating the use of financial
incentives in combination with a regulatory framework to help protect biodiversity on private
land by inducing land owners to manage their own land); C. Foster Knight, Comment,
Voluntary Environmental Standards vs. Mandatory Environmental Regulations and
Enforcement in the NAFTA Market, 12 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 619 (1995); and
Mikkelson, supra note 160.
209. Hahn & Stavins, supra note 208.
-210. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642(1994). The Clean Air Act authorizes the use of tradeable
emissions allowances which allow one polluter to sell its right to pollute to another polluter.
211. Richard B. Stewart, Models for Environmental Regulation: Central Planning
Versus Market-BasedApproaches, 19 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 547,551 (1992). Stewart
offers a complete argument in favor of market-based regulation for most environmental
pollution. Cf. Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985)
(arguing for command-and-control regulation).
212. Stewart, supra note 211, at 551.
213. Id. at 552.
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There are five general categories of incentive based regulation. The
first is the imposition of pollution charges. This method charges a tax per
unit of pollution discharged. 14 The second is a tradable permit system, as
in the Clean Air Act. Under this regime, an overall level of pollution is
allowed for, and a percentage is allotted to concerned firms." 5 The third
system is a deposit refund system; as with bottle returns.216 Removal of
market barriers, such as allowing voluntary exchange of water rights in the
west, is the fourth idea.27 The final method is the elimination of govern-
ment subsidies. An example of this is the Forest Service's practice of
selling timber rights below the cost of making the timber available.1 8
Market-based pollution control has generally been advocated for
pollutants for which some deliberate release is acceptable. Oil spills from
tankers present a different problem. Unlike sulfur releases into the air, an
oil spill is caused by an accident, usually beyond the control of the vessel.
Because of this, traditional incentive based regulation, such as tradable
permits, are of limited applicability. There is also no legally tolerable level
of oil that can be released into water due to oil spills, so permitting would
not work.
Incentive based regulation would work if oil shippers are rewarded for
taking additional steps to reduce and eliminate the number of oil spills. As
the discussion on the proposed plan below will explain, establishing
liability limits for vessels that take additional steps could provide a way for
tankers to adopt various methods that would work, and yet be flexible
enough to allow for changing technology without costly governmental
studies and enforcement.
C. Oil Spill Prevention Plan
The proposed plan is a cross between traditional command-and-control
and incentive based regulation. It favors command-and-control regulation
by setting certain minimum requirements, but favors incentive based
regulation by giving industry an option on whether it wants to implement
such a program, how the requirements will be implemented if it does, and
214. Hahn & Stavins, supra note 208, at 7.
215. Id. at 9.
216. Id. at 10.
217. Id. at 10-11.
218. Id. at 11.
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what the company's policy will be. In this sense it resembles the concept
contained in S.1730 section 102. As discussed above, section 102 provides
economic incentives to shippers that convert (or switch) single-hull vessels
to double-hull vessels before the statutory requirement under OPA. The
plan is also different than using unlimited liability to encourage vessels to
take action because under the proposal a vessel that takes additional steps
will be rewarded compared to a vessel that takes none.
The plan is not presented as a pure form of incentive based regulation.
For, unlike the Clean Air Act, which allows some polluted emissions to
enter the air, current law forbids any oil from entering the water.219 This
prevents the trading of permits to achieve a given level of emissions.
Furthermore, the nature of the proposed program, the reduction in liability,
does not lend itself to allowing companies to unilaterally decide what level
of compliance and requirements should be adopted. If shippers could take
whatever actions they wanted to and have them automatically deemed
sufficient under the program, it is doubtful that much would be done.
Minimum guidelines would have to be established to give shippers some
idea of what is required.' 0 If oil shippers were allowed to use varying
technologies, such as different types of hull design that might be as
effective in preventing oil spills as double hulls are, the shippers could
tailor their operations to best fit both their needs and the needs of society.
This is far cheaper and more flexible than traditional command-and-control
methods.Y
1. Discussion
It is generally agreed that the best way to protect the environment from
an oil spill is to prevent one from occurring. The disagreement is over how
to best accomplish this. Many people believe that the polluter should pay
for clean-up costs, and therefore prevention costs. To do otherwise, they
argue, would be to subsidize oil spills. Shipping interests want caps on
liability. They feel that liability limitations would encourage responsibility
219. A small number of exceptions, such as an act of God or war, are allowed. See 33
U.S.C. § 2703 (1994).
220. This is exactly what the application notes to the Guidelines do. As discussed above,
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines do not establish exactly what must be done by a
corporation. Instead, the Guidelines establish certain minimum requirements that must be
accounted for.
221. Stewart, supra note 211, at 553.
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among operators. Ship owners further believe that if all states, around the
world, enact different legislation and impose different requirements, a
regulatory nightmare would result. Doubtless, this possibility is real.
Washington state decided to force the potential polluter to pay for an
elaborate prevention plan.222 Its current plan costs the state an estimated $5
million per year.223 The proposed plan would greatly reduce the costs to the
state and would allow the shipper to utilize cost-benefit analysis by
determining the costs of alternatives.
2. The Proposed Prevention Program
The proposed plan would enact general standards and let shipping
interests decide how best to meet those standards. For example, a standard
could be that "in the event of an engine failure, the vessel must be able to
control direction." Instead of mandating that a vessel have emergency
engines, if given the choice, the tanker may decide it is easier and more cost
effective to have a tug escort, or to have some other means of regaining
control. This would promote innovation because regulations would not
lock-in technology standards. Instead of enacting the provisions as an
outright requirement, they would be enacted as a voluntary prevention plan
program analogous to the role of compliance programs under the Guide-
lines. However, in order for the prevention program to be effective and
work properly, minimum criteria must be established. These criteria could
closely parallel those for compliance programs under the Guidelines.224
Three major differences between the proposed plan and the scheme
under the Guidelines are apparent. First, state oil spill prevention
requirements would provide the foundation and standards, not antitrust or
other federal laws as under the Guidelines. Second, the elaborate system
to determine fines under the Guidelines would not be required, as this plan
proposes to reduce liability to a predetermined level, such as those put forth
by OPA,21 if the tanker meets the minimum requirements. 26 The third
222. It is estimated that it would cost a tanker operator $12,000 to develop a prevention
plan that would comply with the BAP standards. International Ass'n of Indep. Tanker
Owners v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9' Cir. 1998), reh'g en banc denied, 159 F.3d 1220
(9' Cir. 1998).
223. Doughton, supra note 93, at Al. This is the cost to the state, not including the costs
to shipping interests.
224. 18 U.S.C.A § 8C2.5(f) (1996); 18 U.S.C.A § 8A1.2 note (3)(k).
225. See generally William M. Duncan, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990's Effect on the
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difference involves substituting the tanker itself for the organization or
corporation. The application guidelines established for corporate compli-
ance programs under the Guidelines provide a reasonable place to start to
determine guidelines for the oil spill prevention program.
The Guidelines require establishing a program that is reasonably
capable of accomplishing its goal. 7 The larger the corporation, the more
formal the program must be.' The oil spill prevention program would
require a written plan that establishes policies for the tanker that would
reasonably ensure that, if followed, the tanker would be in compliance with
the prevention plan requirements and would be reasonably capable of
preventing an oil spill. This would require the prevention plan to address
all of the procedures and requirements determined to be important to
preventing oil spills from tankers.
Corporations are required to appoint one or more high-level em-
ployee(s) to be responsible for overseeing compliance with the standards
and procedures set forth in the compliance program.' 9 This requirement
could be modified for use on a tanker by requiring an officer on board to
assume this responsibility. An employee of the vessel operator or owner
might also have to be appointed to oversee compliance with maintenance
and construction or other management standards if such standards are
adopted. Regardless of where or who the employee is, (s)he would have
the responsibility of enforcing and self-policing the standards set forth in
the prevention plan.
The third compliance program requirement under the Guidelines
requires corporations to ensure that "substantial discretionary authority"
Shipowner's Limitation ofLiabilityAct, 5U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 303 (1993); Stephen R. Eubank,
Patchwork Justice: State Unlimited Liability Laws in the Wake of the Oil Pollution Act of
1990, 18 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 149 (1994); Marva Jo Wyatt, Financing the Clean-Up:
Cargo Owner Liability for Vessel Spills, 7 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 353 (1995); Frederick J. Carr,
Comment, Statutory Liability for Oil Pollution from Vessels in Marine Environments, 3
U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 267 (1991); and, Daniel Kopec and Philip Peterson, Note, Crude
Legislation: Liability and Compensation Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,23 RuTGERS
LU. 597 (1992).
226. An elaborate system to determine the amount of liability could be used to either
accommodate certain levels of compliance by the polluter or to more closely parallel the
Guidelines and its objectives.
227. 18 U.S.C.A. § 8A1.2 note (3)(k)(1) (1994).
228. Id. § 8A1.2 note (3)(k)(7)(i).
229. Id. § 8A1.2 note (3)(k)(2).
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not be given to individuals likely to engage in criminal activities." This
requirement could be modified for oil spill protection to define "substantial
discretionary authority" to encompass individuals who could in any way
cause an oil spill in state waters, for example, the helmsman or an engi-
neer's mate. In the event that an oil spill is caused by someone with a
history of violations, liability would not be limited if the operator or owner
had not exercised due diligence to correct the situation. Hiring a person
with a documented problem of drinking while on duty and then assigning
that employee to be helmsman would be an example of not exercising due
diligence. If that employee caused an accident and was drinking while on
duty, liability would not be limited.
The organization must make efforts to effectively communicate the
plan to employees."' This goes beyond reading the plan to personnel. The
organization must ensure that employees actually understand the require-
ments, especially with regard to their individual responsibilities. Demon-
strating and explaining the practical application of the prevention plan
requirements using examples of everyday activities and responsibilities of
employees would be favorable. The application note to the Guidelines
suggests that training programs be used.232 This is directly applicable to a
tanker. The prevention program could suggest that safety drills be
conducted. This would help the crew to understand what to do in the event
of an emergency. This could not only prevent a spill but save lives. A
language requirement would also have to be devised to ensure that crew
and officers could effectively communicate.
Organizations must take reasonable steps to ensure compliance.233 The
prevention plan could operate in the same manner. Monitoring and
auditing systems are suggested by the application note to ensure compli-
ance. This leaves the paper plan behind and ventures into active detection
of violations. Once a violation is detected it should be corrected. The
prevention plan should then be updated to account for the problem. The
prevention plan should also address this by establishing in the plan a
system through which employees could report violations without fear of
retribution.
230. Id. § 8A1.2 note (3)(k)(3).
231. Id. § 8A1.2 note (3)(k)(4).
232. Id.
233. 18 U.S.C.A. § 8A1.2 note (3)(k)(5).
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The standards must be consistently enforced and provide for disciplin-
ary measures.' The appropriate disciplinary action would be situation
specific. The plan should provide and identify what action is likely to be
taken for certain conduct. This would require record keeping by the tanker
or its operator to prove that the disciplinary measures have been consis-
tently followed.
The last requirement for compliance programs is that after an offense
is detected, all reasonable steps must be taken to prevent similar offenses
in the future This could be modified for the prevention program to
require prompt notification of officials in the event of a spill. An adequate
contingency plan could also be required here. If the spill was caused by
something that should have been contained in the tanker's prevention plan
but was not, the plan should be modified to include the occurrence.
The Department of Justice looks favorably on compliance programs
that take affirmative steps to detect violations. 6 By using a similar
provision, tanker owners or operators that take steps beyond those
otherwise required to improve safety and reduce the possibility of an oil
spill could be rewarded. Washington provides for a reduction in inspec-
tions or other appropriate action for vessels that go beyond the BAP
standards. 7 Although this would not directly translate to the proposed
program, a similar provision could be developed.
It is doubtful that many, if any, tanker owners or operators would adopt
such a voluntary plan without an incentive to do so. This incentive would
be a limitation on liability. An alternative would be to penalize, through
the use of civil or criminal fines, vessels determined to be deficient in an
area. Perhaps the easiest method would be to substitute state-determined
liability for the liability provisions under OPA for those tankers found to
have an adequate prevention program. By providing a way for tanker
owners to limit their potential liability, they may decide implementing a
prevention plan and program is cost effective. This would be beneficial to
both the state, in that the prevention regulations would be adopted, and the
tanker, because liability would be limited.
There are a number of potential benefits of this proposal. The first is
a reduction in the number and severity of spills. The second would be
234. Id. § 8A1.2 note (3)(k)(6).
235. Id. § 8A1.2 note (3)(k)(7).
236. Spratling, supra note 202, at *3, *6.
237. WASH. ADMiN. CODE § 317-21-560 (1996).
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industry support, or at least minimal industry opposition. A third is that the
program would be easy to enforce. In fact, no enforcement by the state
would be required.238 Whereas various Washington provisions require
filing various plans and documents with the Office of Marine Safety, the
proposed plan could require the vessel to have such documentation
onboard, ready for inspection, in the event of a spill. The only time a state
would have to become involved in the process would be in the event of a
spill. If a vessel never adopted a prevention plan and never had a spill, the
state would not have to take any action or spend any money enforcing a
program. This could save the state a lot of money and time.2 39
The state would also benefit because expensive technology studies
would not have to be conducted. By mandating general, minimal guide-
lines, individual shipping companies could pick the technology best suited
to their own and society's needs. General guidelines would also automati-
cally account for changing federal and state law, and improving technology
without additional legislative action.
Where appropriate, the prevention program should conform to
national240 and international law and conventions.24' States should also try
to work with other states to implement similar, non-conflicting require-
ments. Both of these would help reduce confusion and encourage vessel
compliance.
OPA allows states to determine civil and criminal penalties or fines.242
For example, Maine currently waives the imposition of fines if a discharge
is reported within two hours, the oil is promptly removed, and if the party
reimburses the state's oil spill fund within thirty days of demand by the
state.243 This regulation could be changed and augmented by the state
238. This depends on exactly what type of program would be adopted. It also depends
on individual requirements of the program. For example, the Washington program requires
that three copies of the vessel's plan be filed with the Office. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-
21-070.
239. It is estimated that Washington's program costs the state at least $5 million per
year. Doughton, supra note 93, at Al.
240. See e.g., Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990).
241. See e.g., The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974,
32 U.S.T. 47; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2,
1973, 12 I.L.M. 1319, amended by 1978 Protocol, Feb. 16,1978,17 I.L.M. 546; Convention
on the International Regulation for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T.
3459.
242. 33 U.S.C. § 2718(c)(2) (1994).
243. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 550 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996).
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legislature. The provision could be changed to incorporate the prevention
plan. The legislature could also establish substantial civil and criminal
fines and penalties for vessels without a prevention plan that illegally
discharge oil into the marine environment. This would provide an added
incentive for vessels to voluntarily adopt the prevention plan.
3. Federal Preemption Analysis of the Proposal
The proposed prevention plan for tankers would be voluntary. It would
not require tankers to take any action they are currently not required to, and
it would not impose any fees or taxes upon the tanker. It would only come
into action in the event of an oil spill. Ray held valid a Washington law,
albeit under different legislation, because otherwise preempted design
requirements were tied to a constitutional alternative, a tug escort.2' There
were, however, a couple of other factors that the Court believed were
important.
The Court highlighted that the tug escort provision was not the type of
regulation that should be uniform across the country.245 Because OPA
explicitly allows states to determine their own liability and penalty
schemes, these issues do not need to be uniform across the country. If
Congress changes its mind after states assert regulations using this
authority, it can always amend OPA.
Another factor mentioned by the Court was the minimal cost of the tug
escort requirement.2 6 The Washington law in Ray imposed a new cost on
tankers regardless of the option they choose. If they choose the tug escort,
it would cost them under $0.01 per barrel. If they choose the design
requirements, they would be subject to additional costs. Under the
proposed scheme, tankers would not incur any additional costs over those
presently and legally imposed upon them as non-compliance with the
prevention plan would cost the tankers nothing. Tankers would only incur
additional costs if they voluntarily adopted the prevention plan.
The final factor mentioned by the Court was that a tug escort require-
ment would have little international significance.247 The proposed scheme,
244. See supra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
245. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179 (1978).
246. Id. at 180; see also supra note 66 and accompanying text.
247. Id. at 180; see also supra note 64. Intertanko also determined that international
ramifications were of little concern because parts of OPA already contradict such
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under the reasoning of Ray, would classify the proposed program as a
liability provision and not preempted design or manning requirements.
Although allowing states to determine liability might have international
ramifications, Congress specifically allows states to determine liability
limits under OPA. It was this issue that delayed federal oil pollution
legislation for fifteen years.24
The discussion above highlights Supreme Court thinking under Ray.
This is important because OPA provides that state regulations are to be
consistent with Ray.249 The proposed prevention plan would be nothing
more than an elaborate liability scheme. Washington was allowed to waive
its right to impose the tug escort requirement for vessels that met certain
design criteria.' The same analysis should allow states to waive their
statutorily granted right to impose unlimited liability and set civil and
criminal penalties for vessels that are in compliance with its tanker oil spill
prevention program.
V. CONCLUSION
Preventing oil from being discharged into the marine environment is
undoubtedly the best oil spill strategy. What is controversial is who should
be responsible for setting the requirements and how should it be funded.
OPA established certain minimum requirements specifically aimed at
preventing oil spills. So did Washington State, and it involved them in a
legal battle that even now has the potential to go to the Supreme Court. For
this reason, a way around preemption challenges must be found. Also, if
states want to enact design and construction standards, a way must be
found. Aside from this, traditional command-and-control legislation has
been criticized for failing to account for inefficiencies and stagnating
innovation. The proposed methodology would avoid both of these
problems.
Many interested parties, such as Intertanko, argue that OPA preempts
stand alone state design and manning requirements. They would, however,
also likely agree that OPA preserves the right of states to impose unlimited
liability upon tankers that illegally discharge oil into the marine environ-
regulations.
248. Donaldson, supra note 78, at 543.
249. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
250. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. at 173.
1999] State Incentive Based Oil Tanker Regulation
ment of the state. Under Ray, otherwise preempted requirements were held
constitutional because a valid alternative existed. States can enact a valid
unlimited liability scheme. That would be the valid alternative. The
proposed prevention plan should be allowed, even if stand alone regulations
are unconstitutional, when offered to tankers as an option. By offering a
voluntary liability limitation scheme for tankers that meet or exceed certain
requirements, state regulations should survive a preemption challenge.
A plan such as the one proposed would not ensure 100 percent
compliance. However, by doing nothing, states are almost guaranteed that
no action beyond the OPA requirements will be taken by tankers. The cost
of establishing the proposed program to the state could be as little as that
needed to enact the legislation or promulgate the required administrative
rules. The potential, though unquantifiable, upside is fewer and/or less
catastrophic oil spills.
The cost to tankers would be nothing if they chose not to adopt the
program. For them, the potential benefits could be billions of dollars in
savings in the event of a spill. Adopting the program would allow tanker
owners and operators to run cost benefit analyses against predeterminable
figures. Mobil Oil already believes the high cost of safer tankers is
dwarfed by potential oil spill remediation and punitive damages."' If the
reward for building safer tankers was even greater, it is likely they, and
others, would build more of them. In a spill such as the Exxon Valdez, if
Exxon had been given the choice (and complied with the program) between
implementing a program such as the one proposed, which would result in
limited liability (and may have prevented the spill or reduced its severity),
and unlimited liability, for which choice do you think they would have
opted?
251. Daniel Southerland, Mobilizing the Fleet; Oil Giant Hopes Emphasis on Tanker
Safety Also Will Produce Profits, WASH. POST, June 23, 1996, at HO.
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